Trying to Understand the Guard attack at Waterloo

By Gareth Glover / 4 years ago

Like many Waterloo enthusiasts, I have read numerous accounts
of the actions of the French Imperial Guard at Waterloo and have found that almost
every one differs in at least some details from the next. This is not
surprising due to the large number of eyewitness accounts which seemingly
cannot agree. The only thing that all historians of the battle do agree on was
that there were 23 battalions of the Imperial Guard infantry at Waterloo,
although some believe that two of these battalions were formed as one, so we do
not have full unanimity even here. To illustrate these differences of opinion,
without judging anybody’s version better or worse than any other, I list below
firstly the ‘Classic’ historians’ views of how each battalion was deployed and
then follow it with all of the main modern historians who have attempted to
solve it. As can readily be seen, some things are not contentious at all, but
the role of others are viewed very diversely indeed.

Source

1/1G

2/1G

1/2G

2/2G

1/3^G

2/3G

4G

1/1C

2/1C

1/2C

2/2C

1/3C

2/3C

1/4C

2/4C

1/1T

2/1T

1/3T

2/3T

1/1V

2/1V

1/3V

2/3V

Petit

R

S

P

F

H

F

L

H

P

B

F

FC

P

Becke

R

P

S

F

H

F

L

S

P

S

F

FC?

P

Lachouque

R

S

P1

F

H

F

L

S

P

H2

F

FC

P

Ropes

R

P?

B?3

F

L

P

B

F

FC?

P

Siborne

R

P?4

S?

F

S

L5

S

P

F

S

P

Houssaye

R

P

S

F

H

F

L

S

P

S

F

FC

P

Uffindel

R

P

S

F

S

F

L

S

P

S

F

P

Barbero

R

P

S

F

S

F

L

S

P

S

F

FC

P

Hofschroesr

R

P

F

H

F

L

H

P

F

P

Adkin

R

P

S

F

H

F

L

S

P

S

F

FC

P

Corrigan

R

P

F

P

F

L

F

FC

P

Chandler

R

P

?6

F

R

F

L

?

P

?

F

FC

P

Hussey

R

P

S

F

H

F

L

P

S

F

FC

P

Field

R

B

P

F

H

F

L

B

P

B

F

FC

P

De Wit

R

B7

P

B

H

B

P

B

F

P

Franklin

R8

R

T

P

S

H

S

L

T

P

T

F

P

Hamilton-Williams

R

S

P9

F

H

F

L

S

P

S

F

FC

P

Dawson

R

P

T

10

S

T

S

L

T

P

T

F

P

Key

G=Grenadiers, C=Chasseurs, T=Tirailleurs, V=Voltigeurs

L= Le Caillou, P=Plancenoit, B= In the valley in front of La
Belle Alliance, F=First Wave Attack, S=Second Wave Attack, H= Near Hougoumont
Orchard, R=Reserve at Rossomme, C=Battalions Combined, ? = Historian admits
they are unsure.

[1] In his Waterloo book, he has the
battalions of the 2nd Grenadiers the other way around. This is how he has them
in Anatomy of Glory.

[2] He states ‘Sent to the left flank by Morand’ p490

[3] Ropes only states that a battalion was in Plancenoit and the other near La Belle Alliance without stating which was exactly where

[4] Siborne does not specify which battalion of 2nd Grenadiers was in Plancenoit.

[5] Siborne has this battalion at Le Caillou and in the second attack – however, he omits to mention 2/2 Grenadiers and I presume that he meant that these took part in the secondary attack – not 1/1 Chasseurs.

[6] David Chandler does not specify any role whatever for these three battalions marked ? Presumably he felt that they stayed in reserve somewhere south of La Belle Alliance.

[7] Pierre states that only the 4 Chasseur battalions advanced to the attack and that none of the others moved beyond the low ground between the two armies and only became involved when the allied forces attacked them.

[8] John Franklin’s map appears to show these two battalions at La Belle Alliance, but the text confirms that they were at Rossomme

[9] On page 338 he says the 1/2G and on page 340 he states the 2/2G were in Plancenoit, but he later puts 1/2G in the secondary attack – I have therefore ignored p338 as a typographical error.

[10] Paul Dawson believes that Major Golzio was in charge of 1st battalion, hence it was 1/2G in Plancenoit. See p402

It has to be admitted, that even I have made a previous
attempt at solving this issue, but given further information which has since
come to light, I wish to -perhaps rather rashly – try to produce the most
accurate theory yet, based on all of the available evidence.

Which Guard
Battalions can we be certain where they deployed?

Looking at the above list of battalions of the Imperial
Guard, it seems that the deployment of 11 of the 23 (or 22 – see later)
battalions can be identified with very great certainty as all historians place
these units in the same location.

The 1^st and 2^nd Battalions of the 1^st
Grenadiers were kept as a reserve in the area of Rossomme.

General Petit, who commanded 1^st Grenadiers
states ‘…the 1^st Regiment of Grenadiers formed …two squares…The 2^nd
Battalion to the right of the main road…dominating the small track which ran
between the village of Planchenoit and the main road. …The square of the 1^st
Battalion formed on the left of the main road, on the height that the Emperor
had first occupied.’[1]

The 1^st Battalion 1^st Chasseurs
remained in the vicinity of Le Caillou throughout as a guard at headquarters

Whilst the 8 battalions of the Young Guard – that is the 1^st
and 2^nd Battalions of the 1^st and 3^rd Tirrailleurs
and the 1^st and 2^nd Battalions of the 1^st and 3^rd
Voltiguers were all deployed in Plancenoit to hold the village against the
Prussian advance.

After that good start, we now only have to deal with the
other 12 battalions

Which other
battalions were sent to Plancenoit later?

Most historians agree that two further battalions were later
sent to bolster the Young Guard and to drive the Prussians back out of
Plancenoit, but a few claim there were three. So what is the evidence?

The first battalion which is almost universally accepted to
have been in Plancenoit was 1^st Battalion 2^nd Chasseurs

The evidence for this deployment comes from Brigadier Pelet who
commanded 2^nd Chasseurs, who says ‘General Morand said to me “Go with your 1^st Battalion to
Planchenoit [sic], where the Young Guard has been beaten.”[2]

If anyone should know, it would be him, and there seems to
be little contention regarding this battalion. This however is not true of the
other battalion deployed there.

We know for certain that a battalion of the 2^nd
Grenadiers was also deployed in the Plancenoit area but which one has divided
historians quite evenly and a number, such as Ropes and Siborne avoid stating
which battalion was sent at all. So what is the evidence?

Pelet of the 2^nd Chasseurs states ‘Whilst the 1^st battalion of the 2^nd
Chasseurs were throwing themselves against the Prussians, the 1^st
Battalion of the 2^nd Grenadiers under the orders of Lieutenant
Colonel Golzio, received the order to support it.’[3]

Now, the naming of the commander of the battalion as Golzio
is very useful, but according to Mark Adkin, Golzio commanded 2^nd
Battalion of the 2^nd Grenadiers, not the 1^st Battalion as
stated by Pelet.

However, Paul Dawson confuses the issue in his recent book,
as he uses the following quote from General Christiani commanding 2^nd
Grenadiers twice, but in error gives two different translations,

On page 337 he states, ‘I
received the order to send a battalion of the regiment into the village, that
was to the right, behind the position I occupied…It was M Golzio, head of the 1^st
Battalion of the regiment that went on this mission’.

Whereas on page 402 he states ‘I received the order to send a battalion of the regiment into the
village, that was to the right, behind the position I occupied…It was M Golzio,
head of the 2^nd [Sic] Battalion of the regiment that went on this
mission’.

Paul makes it clear that he believes that the 1^st
battalion fought at Plancenoit, and backs this up by quoting de Mauduit,
although de Mauduit was in the 1^st Grenadiers and was not a witness
to the deployment. The other witnesses quoted to support this statement really
prove nothing either way.

Andrew Field provides the same quote and translates it as ‘Between five and six pm, …I received the
order to send a battalion of the regiment into a village situated to the right
rear of the position that I occupied, to chase away the Prussians … I gave this
mission to M. Golzio who commanded the second battalion of the regiment.’[4]

The only way to end this
confusion of what General Christiani said was to view the original source.
Having done so I can confirm that it definitely states that ‘Between five and six pm, perhaps later, I received the order to
send a battalion of the regiment to the village situated to the right rear of
the position that I occupied to drive off the Prussians who had come to seize
it. It was M. Golzio, chief of the 2^nd Battalion of the regiment
that I tasked with this mission….’,

but the clinching sentence has unfortunately been
omitted by them both, as he continues ‘Finally,
towards 7pm I think, I left with the 1^st Battalion that remained to
me, to go to join the Emperor who was to the left of the road, a little
distance from the position that I had previously left’.

As he commanded the other battalion personally, we can be
certain therefore that Golzio did command the 2^nd Battalion 2^nd
Grenadiers and that it was this battalion that was deployed in Plancenoit.

This is further confirmed by Pigeard[5]
which says Composition de la Garde impériale à
Waterloo [1064], 2e Grenadier Maréchal-de-camp baron Christiani, 1er bat. Chef
de bataillon Martenot de Cordoux, 2e bat. Chef de bataillon Golzio Ref 1064.
S.H.A.T Xab 68 à 74

No other battalion of the Guard were sent to Plancenoit. Therefore,
we can be certain that only these two battalions were deployed here, the 2^nd
Battalion 2^nd Grenadiers and the 1^st Battalion 2^nd
Chasseurs.

How many battalions
did Napoleon have available to attack Wellington with?

Including the two battalions of 1^st Grenadiers,
but ignoring the 1^st Battalion 1^st Chasseurs, who could
not leave headquarters unguarded, Napoleon had a maximum of 12 battalions
available, although many historians say only 11 were available, why?

There is no argument over the 4^th Grenadiers who certainly
took part in the Waterloo campaign as a single battalion regiment; but many
claim that at Waterloo the 1^st and 2^nd Battalions of the
4^th Chasseurs were combined into a composite battalion, following
heavy losses to this regiment at the Battle of Ligny two days earlier.

What is the evidence for this?

It is stated by Petit that ‘the 4^th Regiments…because of their weakness of numbers,
formed only one square each’.[6]
But it has to be said that this is virtually the only evidence for this
happening.

In an email correspondence with Paul Dawson, he has provided
me with losses (killed, wounded and missing combined) for the Guard Regiments
at Ligny, taken from the regimental records in the French Army Archives.

This gives losses as 1^st Grenadiers 43, 2^nd
Grenadiers 152, 3^rd Grenadiers 107, 4^th Grenadiers 29, 1^st
Chasseurs 32, 2^nd Chasseurs 0, 3^rd Chasseurs 0 and 4^th
Chasseurs 229.

Now these figures do show that the 4^th Chasseurs
did suffer the highest losses of the Guards regiments at Ligny, but with an
average loss of 115 per battalion (I do not have individual battalion losses)
were these really heavy enough to cause the battalions to combine, given that
the regiment entered the battle of Ligny with 1071 officers and men[7]?
I do not think so.

This left each battalion with little over 400 men each, whereas
the others all averaged no more than 500 men each and I believe the evidence
below will show that the two battalions of the 4^th Chasseurs still
acted independently and were not combined at Waterloo.

Therefore, Napoleon did have twelve battalions with which to
attack Wellington.

Which Guards
Battalions attacked the Allied Ridge?

It is clear that the two battalions of each regiment of the
3^rd and 4^th Chasseurs of the Middle Guard attacked the
allied ridge and this is not disputed by any of the historians, although as
already discussed, many follow Petit and say that there were only three
battalions (the 4^th Chasseurs being combined)

There is also almost universal agreement that the Grenadier
battalions of the Middle Guard were also initially sent forward against the
allied ridge, these consisted of the two battalions of the 3^rd
Grenadiers and the single battalion of the 4^th Grenadiers. However,
Napoleon then ordered the 2^nd Battalion 3^rd Grenadiers to
proceed to the left and to take position somewhere towards Hougoumont orchard
to protect the left of the Guard attack, leaving only two Grenadier battalions
in this attack.

What evidence do we have to back these statements?

Napoleon himself records his view of the Guard attack,
stating that ‘Some regiments drew back, I noticed this….Realizing, that I still
needed another quarter of an hour to rally my whole Guard, I put myself at the
head of four battalions and advanced to the left, in front of La Haie Sainte….It
was important that the Guard should be in action all at once, but the eight
other battalions were still in the rear…I ordered General Friant to go with
these four battalions of the Middle Guard to meet the enemy’s attack. The four
battalions repulsed everybody that they encountered….Ten minutes later, the
other battalions of the Guard arrived.’[8]

Some discount this statement, but many historians that do,
happily use Napoleon’s own words when they fit with their views, in a case of
double standards. What has Napoleon got to gain by admitting that his
deployment of the Guard was rushed because some troops were beginning to
retreat and that they were sent piecemeal into the fray? This only brings
criticism on himself and is therefore most likely his honest view of matters.

It should be noted that Napoleon states that he ordered the
four battalions of the Middle Guard which were ready first to proceed in their
attack and that the other eight battalions would not be in position for a further
ten minutes. He agrees that he had twelve battalions available in total, this
also supports my belief that the 4^th Chasseurs were still acting as
separate units.

Gourgaud closely follows Napoleon’s statement, describing
how ‘The Emperor…marched with the four
first battalions to the left of La Haye Sainte. …A quarter of an hour after,
the other eight battalions arrived on the brink of the ravine. One battalion in
order of battle, having two in close column on its flanks. Two of these
brigades thus ranged and marching at battalion distance, formed a first line,
behind which the third brigade was posted in reserve…’

He concurs that Napoleon advanced with four battalions and
that eight others drew up some fifteen minutes later. He further indicates that
these latter eight battalions were deployed in three brigades. Two brigades
formed of three battalions formed in l’ordre mixed and two remaining in
reserve, which must refer to the two battalions of the 1^st
Grenadiers.

Mauduit of the 1^st Grenadiers and who therefore
was not directly involved also agrees that ‘…time
was too precious, …that he [Napoleon] did not even think there was time to wait
for the second column of the Guard, which needed fifteen minutes to get itself
organised’[9]

We also have the memoir of an unknown officer (of the 2^nd
Corps?), who confirms that ‘Four
battalions of the Guard who had not yet fought, advanced, ….Eight other
battalions arrived fifteen minutes later.’ [10]

Marshal Ney, who was prominently involved in this attack
also records that ‘A short time
afterwards, I saw four regiments of the Middle Guard advancing, led on by the
Emperor’.[11]

Now here, Ney does say four regiments rather than battalions
(ie the 3^rd & 4^th Chasseurs and Grenadiers), but he
is the only one that states this and this would mean that most of the Guard (up
to 7 of the available 10 battalions for the attack) were brought forward
together and therefore Napoleon’s statement regarding the poor coordination of
the attack was wrong. He is out of kilter with everybody else and I believe
that he may have meant four battalions rather than regiments.

How did this attack
progress?

Some historians claim that the Grenadiers and the Chasseurs
of the Middle Guard (5 or 6 battalions as previously discussed) attacked
together, arriving across a broad front on the allied ridge in echelon to the
left, therefore having the Grenadiers arriving first and the 4^th
Chasseurs last. But does this correspond with the known evidence?

Petit states that this exactly how they advanced, but we
must again state that he was not an eye witness, being at Rossomme with the 1^st
Grenadiers.

General Pelet of the 2^nd Chasseurs states ‘the 3^rd and 4^th
Regiments of Chasseurs during the attack, agree that these regiments had
received only a few musket shots and a few cannon balls that were fired from
their left.’…Michel [Commander of the Chasseurs of the Guard] and Mallet
[Commander of the 3^rd Chasseurs] fell dead with the first divisions.
General Friant was seriously injured.’…These four masses heroically endured a
terrible fire on our four battalions. Battalion commanders Angelet [2^nd
Battalion 3^rd Chasseurs], Cardinal [1^st Battalion 3^rd
Chasseurs] Agnes [1^st Battalion 4^thChasseurs) fell dead[12]
with a large number of officers and half of the Chasseurs’. But importantly
he goes further ‘All agree that the
regiments of grenadiers were several hundred feet behind and could not take
part in this attack’. Adding ‘We are
forced to admit that this heroic attack went very badly. …Firstly we did not
wait for the arrival of the grenadiers… we did not wait for the end of the
deployment executed under fire from the enemy, to make a simultaneous attack.
All attacks were isolated and disconnected.’

Gourgaud concurs ‘The
eight battalions of Guards…instead of advancing to support the four battalions
engaged’ and again ‘Meanwhile the
four battalions of the middle guard were engaged with the enemy; they repulsed
all before them [so that] upon the arrival of the Old Guard we should be masters
of the whole field of battle.’

General Foy on 23 June wrote ‘The third and fourth regiments of chasseurs were ordered to move
forward and form into squares by battalion to the left of the roadway in the
direction of La Haye Sainte, the fourth regiment of chasseurs suffered at the Battle
of Ligny, which despite these losses did not advance with less resolution’

And Corporal Pierre Alexander Tousaint le Cat of the 3^rd
Chasseurs states ‘We attacked the English
positions … and were supported moments later by the brave grenadiers marching
along the road against La Haye Sainte’. [13]

This would appear to be conclusive and in perfect agreement
with Napoleon’s own statement. The four battalions of Chasseurs were first to
form up and General Friant was ordered to take them forward in the attack, some
10-15 minutes before the Grenadiers and the Chasseurs of the Old Guard could
form up. These four battalions marched up the allied ridge with the 1^st
Battalion 3^rd Chasseurs arriving at the point they describe as –
where there is a ridge of land separating the shallow valleys of La Haye Sainte
and Hougoumont. This tongue of land is very evident on the battlefield even
today and led up to a plateau between two sections of sunken roadway and at the
juncture of 3 roads/trackways. This is the plateau where the Lion Mound has
since been constructed. French sources rarely describe how these four
battalions marched, except that they universally state that they were in squares
and that they endeavoured to deploy when within about one hundred yards of the
allied ridge where they came under intense fire from the British infantry of
Colin Halkett’s and Maitland’s Brigades. Almost every English Guards officer
that has described this attack, state that the French attacked in columns
rather than squares, but with a frontage of two companies wide (or grand
divisions), hence they could be describing something which looked like a solid
square. They also state that there were two columns only, which might indicate
that the two battalions of each regiment formed in column behind each other,
although Captain Barlow of the 69^th Foot states that there were four
columns. Were the Guards only mentioning the two columns directly in their
front whilst the other two columns struck Halkett’s troops? This seems the most
likely scenario and it is almost certain that the French advanced in compact
squares and attempted to deploy into line at 100 yards.

Indeed, if we look to the statements of the 1^st
Battalion 3^rd Grenadiers and 4^th Grenadiers, this belief
that the Grenadiers advanced some time after the Chasseurs is corroborated by
General Poret de Morvan who commanded the 3^rd Chasseurs, who states
in the third person ‘Already in the first
line of the Imperial Guard, the brave Generals Friant [commanding the
Chasseur attack] and Michel [commanding
the Chasseurs] had been wounded… and
Colonel Malet [commanding 1^st Battalion 3^rd
Chasseurs] was killed….the column, led by
Poret de Morvan [3^rd Grenadiers], who ascended the plateau to the pas de charge under a terrible fire, came
to revive the first line’.[14]
I have underlined this final phrase, which confirms that the Grenadiers came up
after the Chasseurs as effectively a second wave of attack. This struck the
allied line further to the east (on the other side of the tongue of land) and
was therefore invisible to most of the British troops who had fought the
Chasseur attack.

Chef de Battalion Guillemin of the 1^st Battalion
3^rd Grenadiers says they arrived ‘on the plateau that dominated the battlefield’[15]
which would be in the area of the tongue of land where the Lion Mound now
stands.

This is confirmed by Colonel Crabbe who records ‘I found the Marshal [Ney] in the middle of
the 3^rd Grenadiers on the plateau…At his side was General Friant…and
…Colonel Poret de Morvan’[16]

Meanwhile, an officer of the 4^th Grenadiers
writing in 1823 states ‘We advanced at
the pas de charge with our bayonets, our flank against La Haye Sainte’.[17]
This would indicate that the 4^th was to the right of the 1^st/3^rd
Grenadiers.

This means that the attack of the 3^rd and 4^th
Chasseurs and the two battalions of Grenadiers must be viewed as two separate
attacks with ten to fifteen minutes between them. In fact the Chasseur attack
was virtually over and the British Guards were driving them back down the slope
when the second attack went in. Because of the spit of land separating them,
the Guards could not have been aware of this second attack, especially with the
incessant noise and smoke of the battle. However, because the 2^nd
Battalion 3^rd Grenadiers had been sent elsewhere, this attack was
made in two columns, not in l’ordre mixed’ as originally intended for the 3
battalions.

This was eventually beaten back, it would appear, by the
attack of the Dutch Belgian troops under Detmer, as all other troops in the
area admit that they were suffering badly, including Halkett’s Brigade.

What of the 2^nd
Battalion 3^rd Grenadiers?

There is little contention amongst the various historians as
to the initial role of the 2^nd Battalion 3^rd Grenadiers.
This battalion was sent ‘a long cannon shot’ to the left of the main chaussee
to protect the left flank of the Chasseurs attack, but it seems that it was
also used by Napoleon as his vantage point to watch the attack unfold.

Friant as an example states that ’the 2^nd battalion of the 3^rd Grenadiers was
detached to the left and remained there’,

Pelet also states that ‘General
Roguet … according to General Cambronne, was with the 2^nd battalion
of the 3^rd Regiment of Grenadiers’

Petit also confirms that Napoleon was there ‘the
2nd Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of Grenadiers, where the Emperor was to be
found, had held its ground’[18]

We will return to the story of this battalion later.

What of the last
three battalions of the Guards?

Initially, the three remaining battalions were brought
forward of La Belle Alliance and were formed in the low ground between the two
ridges, the 1^st Battalion 2^nd Grenadiers near La Haye
Sainte, whilst the 2^nd Battalion 1^st Chasseurs under
Cambronne and the 1^st Battalion 2^nd Chasseurs were placed
in the centre, closer to the 2^nd Battalion the 3^rd
Regiment of Grenadiers.

A number of historians claim that these three battalions
simply remained here as a reserve and were not employed until the allied
infantry and cavalry attacked them. But that is not what the French say
themselves and it may well be the key to understanding the various claims by
the British infantry regiments involved ie the Guards versus the 52^nd
Foot.

With regard to the 1^st Battalion of the 2^nd
Grenadiers, they appear to have remained in the vicinity of La Haye Sainte as a
reserve to the Grenadier attack already mentioned. This is what their commander
Christiani states himself and I have no evidence to refute his statement. Christiani
did however get close enough to state that ‘the
British position was defended by a deep ravine [sunken road]’.

The battalion does appear to have helped extricate the
remnants of the two Grenadier battalions that did attack the allied ridge, as
both De Mauduit and General Guyot state that at one stage the French Guard
heavy cavalry attacked to extricate Colonel Martenot of 1^st
Battalion 2^nd Grenadiers and Poret de Morvan with the 1^st
Battalion 3^rd Grenadier from a cavalry attack.

Captain Powell of the British 1^st Foot Guards
relates how after defeating the Guard ‘We
charged down the hill till we had
passed the end of the orchard of Hougoumont, when our right flank became
exposed to another heavy column. This circumstance.. obliged the brigade to
retire towards their original position.’[19]
This statement is corroborated by virtually every Guards officer on the ridge
that day. This had followed an intense firefight of some five minutes if not
longer before the Chasseurs retired.

We believe this attack of the Chasseurs was delivered in
echelon and because of this, a number of historians have attempted to explain
this new column away as the 4^th Chasseurs, which would have of
course arrived last in the echelon attack and this was, they claim then
attacked by the 52^nd and supported by the rest of Adam’s Brigade.

The problem with this theory is that the 4^th
Chasseurs (in two columns) would have to have been a full twenty minutes or
more[20]
behind the 3^rd Chasseurs, for this scenario to work, that is one
hell of an echelon!

On seeing the defeat of the Chasseurs and their being driven
down from the ridge, we know that General Cambronne marched his battalion of
Chasseurs to join the 2^nd Battalion 3^rd Grenadiers and
his Emperor. How do we know this?

General Petit states that ‘During
all these misfortunes, the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Regiment of Grenadiers,
where the Emperor was to be found, had held its ground. General Cambronne
arrived at the same position with the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Regiment of
Chasseurs’

General Friant concurs, saying ’the 2^nd Battalion of the 3^rd Grenadiers was
detached to the left and remained there, although he was heavily attacked,
General Cambronne, a colonel of the 1^st Chasseurs, came to his aid
with the 2^nd battalion of his regiment’

Another unknown officer says ‘The 2^nd Battalion of the 1^st Chasseurs commanded
by General Cambronne, went on his part to support’[21]

And De Mauduit adds that ‘General Cambronne moved rapidly forward with the 1^st [Sic]
Battalion of his regiment, …..and he was followed by the … 2^nd
Battalion of the 2^nd Chasseurs’.

I therefore believe that the column which caused the Guards
to hurriedly retire back to the Allied ridge was not the 4^th
Chasseurs.

Was there a Third
Attack?

Do the French claim that this little ad-hoc brigade
consisting of the 2^nd Battalion 3^rd Grenadiers, the 2^nd
Battalion 1^st Chasseurs and the 1^st Battalion 2^nd
Chasseurs form up to attack?

General Friant states that ’the 2^nd battalion of the 3^rd Grenadiers detached
to the left … General Cambronne, … came to his aid with the 2^nd
Battalion of his regiment … General Roguet tried in vain to take the offensive,
the great disproportion of forces and cruel losses already experienced, and
constantly increasing, did not allow for more, it was necessary to retreat but
not without a fight, the enemy still saw before him the Imperial Guard’[22]

The unknown officer records that ‘The 2^nd Battalion of the 3^rd Grenadiers detached
on the left,… The 2^nd Battalion of the 1^st Chasseurs
commanded by General Cambronne, went on his part to support and cover the
retreat and the flank of the other battalions of the Guard.’[23]
Even if he advanced to cover the retreat, it would appear to the allies to be
an advance.

De Mauduit ‘General
Cambronne moved rapidly forward with the 1^st [sic] Battalion of his
regiment…..and he was followed by the 2^nd Battalion of the 3^rd
Grenadiers and 2^nd Battalion of the 2^nd Chasseurs’. With
this small reinforcement the emperor would still try the offensive…’[24]

Captain de Steurs of the 2^nd Battalion 2^nd
Chasseurs says that ‘after the flight of
the debris of the four battalions of the Middle Guard…it was not possible to
rally them behind the small reserve which we, the Imperial Guard, formed.’[25]

How far this advance went is very difficult to ascertain,
but given that their advance did cause the British Guards to return rapidly
towards the allied ridge, it is not inconceivable then that they began to
ascend the allied ridge in pursuit, as a final attempt to break through the
allied line.

Indeed a number of Frenchmen who were in this attack
actually claim to have reached the plateau which now forms the base of the Lion
Mound. I quote their later claims here, but I very much doubt that they got so
far, or that they were so far to the east in this advance.

Chasseur Chaude Jacquet of the 1^st Chasseurs
wrote on 28 November 1832 ‘The square was
on the plateau overlooking the two valleys, at the confluence of three roads
near to where General Michel was killed’.[26]

And Corporal Pierre Salle of the 2^nd Battalion 2^nd
Chasseurs wrote on 14 July 1842 ‘We
formed in square…we stood where the lion mound is’.

These three battalions, added to infantry of the line sent
from Foy’s troops to support the attack, may easily then be the troops that the
52^nd Foot and the rest of Adam’s Brigade defeated with their famous
wheel onto the flank of the column and could at least partly explain the very
large numbers of troops claimed to have been defeated by Adam’s Brigade. As
General Foy wrote on 23 June 1815, ‘We
were ordered with the divisions of Bachelu and Foy to ascend the plateau in
squares. We almost reached the English, when we received a rapid fire of
grapeshot and musketry. It was a hail of death.’

The retreat of these three squares in some disorder, would
also explain how Cambronne was captured by General Hugh Halkett during the
advance of the Osnabruck Battalion in support of Adam’s Brigade.

I will not enter the debate of what happened during the
Guard retreat as no two sources can seem to agree at all.

Conclusion

I believe that we can for the first time, now finally
establish exactly where each of the Imperial Guard battalions were towards the
end of that fateful day and their roles. I believe they are as below: None of
the above historians match this exactly.

Source

1/1G

2/1G

1/2G

2/2G

1/3G

2/3G

1/1C

2/1C

1/2C

2/2C

1/3C

2/3C

1/4C

2/4C

1/1T

2/1T

1/3T

2/3T

1/1V

2/1V

1/3V

2/3V

My Interpretation

H/T

L= Le Caillou, P=Plancenoit, B= In the valley in front of La Belle Alliance, F=First Wave Attack, S=Second Wave Attack, H= Near Hougoumont Orchard, R=Reserve at Rossomme,

[1] Andrew Field Waterloo p185

[2] Andrew Field Waterloo the French Perspective p178

[3] Andrew Field p178

[4] Andrew Field p178

[5] Pigeard,
L’Armée napoléonienne, p. 272

[6] Andrew Field Waterloo p 190

[7] Figures from Andrew Field’s Grouchy’s Waterloo p279.

[8]
Napoleon (De Chair) p535.

[9] Andrew Field Waterloo p188.

[10] Paul Dawson Waterloo p356.

[11] Marshal Ney’s own memorial of the
campaign.

[12] Angelet was wounded, the other two
were killed.

[13] Paul Dawson Email.

[14] Paul Dawson Page 363

[15] Field Waterloo p196

[16] Field Waterloo p 196

[17] Email from Paul Dawson

[18] Paul Dawson E mail

[19] Andrew Field page 201.

[20] This period of time has to take
account of the up to ten minute firefight on the ridge line before the Guards
launched their bayonet attack, the time taken for the Guards to proceed down
the ridge in pursuit as far as to be in line with Hougoumont orchard, and the
new column was only then near to the Guards, meaning it was a full five to ten
minute march from the allied ridge line.

[21] Dawson page 405.

[22] Dawson page 394.

[23] Paul Dawson page 405

[24] Paul Dawson page 396

[25] Paul Dawson page 399

[26] Paul Dawson E mail.